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THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND MEDICINE:
THE CASE FOR PROVIDING FEDERAL FUNDING FOR
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, two separate biological research teams announced that they
had made a breakthrough in stem cell research after isolating and remov-
ing stem cells from a human embryo.' This discovery led to much contro-
versy, with the medical community hailing it as a major research
breakthrough, and pro-life groups fiercely objecting because the proce-
dure involved the destruction of a human embryo.2 Around the same
time as the breakthrough finding, medical researchers confirmed that the
method for obtaining stem cells from human embryos required the de-
struction of the embryos. 3 Despite moral and ethical objections, embry-
onic stem cell research has become a major vehicle to develop potential
treatments for many life-threatening diseases. 4
This Note discusses the current state of the U.S. policy on embryonic
stem cell research. Part II provides a background of the science of stem
cell research and an overview of current policies. 5 Part III also discusses
the U.S. government's policy decisions and proposals that have generated
1. See Alo H. Konsen, Note, Are We Killing the Weak to Heal the Sick?: Federally
Funded Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 507, 507 (2002) (explaining
1998 research breakthrough in which embryonic stem cells were first isolated and
cultured). One team, led by John Gearhart at Johns Hopkins University, used
gonad tissue of aborted fetuses to obtain stem cells. See Press Release, Johns Hop-
kins Medical Institute, Hopkins Research Team Cultures Long-Awaited Human
Embryonic Stem Cells (Nov. 5, 1998), at http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/
1998/NOVEMBER/981105A.htm (explaining isolation of stem cells from aborted
fetal tissue). The other team, led by James A. Thomson at the University of Wis-
consin-Madison, used frozen embryos left over from in vitro fertilization proce-
dures. See Terry Devitt, Wisconsin Scientists Culture Elusive Embryonic Stem Cells, Wis.
WEEK (Nov. 5, 1998), at http://www.news.wisc.edu/wisweek/view.msql?id=3327
(explaining isolation of stem cells from human embryos).
2. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 508 (discussing controversy and disagreement
over moral correctness of stem cell research). For a discussion of the isolation and
removal of stem cells from a human embryo, see infra notes 10-13 and accompany-
ing text.
3. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 509 (acknowledging destruction of embryos to
obtain stem cells). "Creating [embryonic stem] cell lines requires researchers to
destroy an embryo." See id. (quoting Sabine Steghaus Kovac, Ethical Loophole Clos-
ing Up for Stem Cell Research, 286 Sci. 31 (1999)).
4. See University of Wisconsin, Embryonic Stem Cell Fact Sheet (Nov. 5, 1998), at
http://www.news.wisc.edu/view.html?id=3319 [hereinafter Stem Cell Fact Sheet] (ex-
plaining medical benefits of embryonic stem cell research).
5. For a discussion of the scientific processes and legal issues surrounding




Newhart: The Intersection of Law and Medicine: The Case for Providing Fede
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the controversy surrounding the research. 6 Part IV presents arguments in
support of embryonic stem cell research. 7 In contrast, Part V examines
the opposing arguments.8 Finally, Part VI proposes suggestions for future




Stem cells are cells from the human body that are unspecialized,
meaning that they are capable of becoming specialized types of cells, such
as muscle or bone cells. 10 Human stem cells are derived from two
sources-human embryos and adult tissue.11 Embryonic stem cells derive
from the inner cell mass of human embryos that have been fertilized
through in vitro fertilization. 12 The inner cell mass is spread over a petri
dish where the cells continue to grow.' 3 Because the inner cell mass con-
6. For a discussion of the policy background behind the stem cell research
controversy, see infra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the scientific, moral and legal arguments in support of a
policy permitting embryonic stem cell research and providing funding for such
research, see infra notes 102-26 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of arguments opposing a federal policy permitting embry-
onic stem cell research and providing funding, see infra notes 12745 and accom-
panying text.
9. For a discussion of the conclusion that the United States should enact a
policy permitting federally funded embryonic stem cell research and proposed
model federal legislation, see infra notes 146-74 and accompanying text.
10. See National Institutes of Health, Stem Cell Information, at http://stemcells.
nih.gov/infoCenter/stemCellBasics.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
Stem Cell Information] (defining characteristics of stem cells).
11. See id. (explaining that human stem cells exist in both human embryos
and adult tissue). Although stem cells can be obtained from both human embryos
and the adult human body, each type has different characteristics. See id. (con-
trasting characteristics of embryonic and adult stem cells). Adult stem cells can be
identified, isolated and retrieved from almost any organ or tissue in the body. See
id. (discussing sources of adult stem cells). Whereas embryonic stem cells are
grown and cultured in the laboratory, scientists are still trying to find ways to cul-
ture adult stem cells. See id. (explaining difficulty involved with culturing adult
stem cells). Further, adult stem cells are far less numerous than embryonic stem
cells. See id. (comparing occurrence of adult stem cells with occurrence of embry-
onic stem cells).
12. See id. (explaining sources of embryonic stem cells). In vitro fertilization
(IVF) is a process in which eggs are removed from a woman's ovaries, fertilized
with sperm and then implanted back into the uterus to artificially create a preg-
nancy. See American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Fact Sheet: In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion (JVF), at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/invitro.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2003) [hereinafter IVFFact Sheet] (explaining IVF process). Couples who
are unable to conceive a child naturally often undergo this procedure. See id. (dis-
cussing purpose of undergoing IVF).
13. See IVFFact Sheet, supra note 12 (explaining early embryo development as
related to stem cell removal process). Research has shown that the best age of an
embryo to extract the inner cell mass to obtain stem cells is four to five days after
[Vol. 49: p. 329
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tains all of the cells of a developing embryo, the embryo ceases to develop
when the mass is removed, causing the embryo to die.1 4
Once the inner cell mass is removed from the embryo, it is cultured
and placed in specialized conditions that allow the cells to continue to
divide and multiply.15 During this process, the cells are transferred several
times to different petri dishes. 1 6 This subculturation process is repeated
for six months; after this point, if the cells have multiplied but have not
become specialized, they become stem cell lines and are suitable for use in
research.' 7 Although stem cells can also be obtained from adult tissue,
researchers prefer to use embryonic stem cells instead of adult stem cells
for three reasons: 1) embryonic stem cells are pluripotent, meaning they
have the potential to differentiate into any of the specialized human cell
types; 2) embryonic stem cells can be grown in large numbers in a con-
trolled laboratory setting; and 3) embryonic stem cells exist in more abun-
dant quantities than do adult stem cells. 18
fertilization. See id. (discussing appropriate age to remove stem cells). This age is
also referred to as the blastocyst stage. See id. (defining blastocyst). In the blasto-
cyst stage, the human embryo consists of three elements: the trophoblast, a layer of
cells that surrounds the embryo; the blastocoel, a hollow area inside the blastocyst;
and the inner cell mass, a cluster of about thirty cells that exists in one part of the
blastocoel. See id. (explaining development at blastocyst stage). This inner cell
mass is removed from the blastocoel to obtain stem cells. See id. (explaining stem
cell removal process).
14. See id. (discussing derivation of stem cells from human embryos). Because
stem cells are actually removed from an embryo that is in between four and five
days post-fertilization development, this results in the embryo no longer being able
to give rise to a human fetus. See Stem Cell Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (explaining that,
without the stem cells, embryo development ceases).
15. See Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (explaining stem cell multiplication
process). The process by which scientists create conditions that allow stem cells to
divide and multiply is called subculturing. See id. (explaining subculturing
process).
16. See id. (further detailing subculturing process). To promote cell growth,
subculturing is performed several times during the development of stem cells that
have been removed from the embryo for approximately six months after their deri-
vation from the embryo. See id. (providing time period for subculturation).
17. See id. (explaining stem cell line development process). Stem cell lines
must consist only of unspecialized cells. See id. (defining stem cell lines). If, dur-
ing the subculturation process, the unspecialized cells begin to develop into spe-
cialized cells (a process called differentiation), they are no longer suitable for
research. See id. (discussing properties of stem cell lines).
18. See id. (discussing advantages of using embryonic stem cells instead of
adult stem cells for research). Embryonic stem cells are pluripotent, or able to
differentiate into any type of cells. See id. (defining pluripotent). Because it is
more advantageous to use pluripotent stem cells for research, embryonic stem cells
are preferred over adult stem cells for research. See id. (explaining usefulness of
embryonic stem cells). By contrast, adult stem cells are usually not pluripotent
because they are found in specific body tissue that has already matured and spe-
cialized. See id. (contrasting embryonic with adult stem cells). In addition, the
number of stem cells present in adult tissue is much lower than the number of
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B. The Legal Status of Embryos-Property, Persons or Somewhere in Between?
1. State Case Law
Although case law surrounding the issue of the legal status of embryos
is limited, some state courts have addressed the issue with respect to cus-
tody disputes over frozen embryos already in existence. 19 These courts
generally have adopted one of two views. Tennessee solely represents the
minority view, as its high court is the only state court to hold that embryos
are potential life and, thus, that the law should afford embryos special
recognition. 20 The majority view, on the other hand, is that frozen em-
bryos are the property of the progenitors. 2 1
Davis v. Davis22 is the leading case illustrating Tennessee's position on
the legal status of embryos. After lower courts grappled with the issue of
the status of embryos for a period of time, the Tennessee Supreme Court
concluded that embryos deserve "special respect" because they are poten-
tial human life.23 Davis involved a dispute between a husband and wife (in
the midst of a divorce) over the appropriate treatment of embryos that
had been created and frozen through an in vitro fertilization procedure. 24
The embryos were extra eggs that had been collected from Mrs. Davis's
19. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (stating that
individuals should not be compelled to become parents against their will by im-
plantation of previously frozen pre-embryos);J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001)
(upholding prior agreement as proper determination of disposition of excess em-
bryos in event of divorce provided that neither party has changed its mind up to
point at which embryos are to be discarded); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176
(N.Y. 1998) (upholding in vitro fertilization agreement stating that, in event of
divorce, unused frozen pre-zygotes would be "determined in a property settle-
ment"); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that embryos are
potential life and are entitled to "special respect"); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261, 269 (Wash. 2002) (rejecting argument that embryo should be called child).
20. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598 (concluding that embryos are potential life).
21. See Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465, 467-68 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding
embryos are property and contract law governs their disposition);JB., 783 A.2d at
719 (holding contract law should control disposition of frozen embryos); Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 180 (same).
22. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
23. See id. ("We conclude that [embryos] are not, strictly speaking, either 'per-
sons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life."). Analyzing three possible ways
to ascribe legal status to embryos-life, property or potential life-the Tennessee
Supreme Court concluded that embryos occupied the third category of "potential
life." See id. at 597 (explaining embryos had potential for life). The Davis court
determined that the intermediate category of "potential life" was appropriate:
The preembryo is due greater respect than other human tissue because
of [an embryo's] potential to become a person and because of its sym-
bolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person,
because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet
established as developmentally individual, and may never realize its bio-
logic potential.
Id. at 596.
24. See id. at 591-92 (stating facts of case). While they were married, Mr. and
Mrs. Davis turned to in vitro fertilization after they were unable to conceive a child.
332 [Vol. 49: p. 329
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ovaries and fertilized outside of her uterus, but had not been implanted in
her uterus by the time of the divorce.
25
The Tennessee Supreme Court, affirming the lower appellate court
ruling, awarded the embryos to Mrs. Davis. 26 The most significant aspect
of the case, however, is the court's recognition that the proper legal status
of embryos was an important issue.27 The disagreement among the lower
courts with respect to this issue is also significant.
28
The majority view, illustrated in the New York case of Kass v. Kass,29 is
contrary to Tennessee's position in that the majority view treats embryos
more like property than persons. In Kass, the New York Court of Appeals
See id. at 592. Mrs. Davis underwent six egg removal and transfer procedures, but
none resulted in a pregnancy. See id.
25. See id. at 591 (explaining in vitro and cryopreservation processes). At the
time Mr. and Mrs. Davis divorced, Mrs. Davis had undergone a seventh IVF at-
tempt, which again did not result in a pregnancy. See id. at 592 (stating facts). The
remaining embryos that were not implanted were cryopreserved, but Mr. and Mrs.
Davis divorced before another transfer procedure could be attempted. See id.
(same).
26. See id. at 604 (affirming appellate court's decision). The appellate court's
reliance on York v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), as a basis of its decision
to award the embryos to Mrs. Davis implied that the embryos were to be treated as
property for the purpose of a divorce agreement. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596
(citing York, 717 F. Supp. at 424-25).
27. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595 ("One of the fundamental issues the inquiry
poses is whether the [embryos] in this case should be considered 'persons' or
'property' in the contemplation of the law."). The court stated that it was impor-
tant to decide the appropriate legal status of embryos for future cases. See id. at
596 (explaining need to give embryos legal status).
28. See id. (noting lower courts' disagreement). The trial court treated the
embryos in question as persons, referring to the embryos as "children in vitro." See
id. at 595 (explaining trial court's decision). The Court of Appeals took the oppo-
site position, implying that the embryos were "property," and should be treated
and divided as property interests in a divorce settlement. See id. at 596 (explaining
appellate court decision).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reached an intermediate conclusion. See id.
at 597 (concluding that embryos occupied intermediate category of "potential
life"). The court recognized that categorizing embryos as "persons" was plainly
incorrect, citing Supreme Court precedent that has held that embryos are not enti-
tled to the same legal rights and protections as persons. See id. at 595 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), for proposition that fetuses do not possess individ-
ual rights); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 527-28
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting potential life exists at point at
which fetus becomes viable). The Davis court thus reasoned that to classify an
embryo as a person would have "vested them with legally cognizable interests sepa-
rate from those of their progenitors," and that prior Supreme Court decisions pre-
vented the vesting of such rights in an embryo. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595
(reasoning that embryos are not persons under federal law).
Likewise, the Davis court concluded that the appellate court's treatment of
the embryos as property was also incorrect because embryos were entitled to spe-
cial respect due to their potential to develop into life. See id. at 597. The court
relied upon this reasoning to support its determination that embryos occupied an
interim category between property and personhood. See id. (reasoning embryos
are potential life).
29. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
5
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faced the question whether to enforce a prior agreement providing for the
disposition of embryos in the event of a divorce.3 The consent agree-
ment signed by Mr. and Mrs. Kass before the in vitro procedure provided
that in the event of a divorce the "legal ownership" of the extra embryos
was to be resolved as part of a "property settlement."3 1 The issue in Kass
was whether the consent agreement clearly expressed both parties' inten-
tions for the disposition of the extra frozen embryos. 32 Applying basic
principles of contract law, the court determined that if the consent agree-
ment unambiguously expressed the parties' intentions about the disposi-
tion of the embryos in a divorce situation, the consent agreement and its
terms would control.
33
At the trial level, the New York Supreme Court held that the consent
agreement should control because both parties clearly indicated their in-
tentions for the disposition of the frozen embryos in a divorce situation.
34
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that Mr. and Mrs. Kass
had clearly demonstrated their intentions, through the consent form, to
allow any unused frozen embryos to be used for research. 35 In upholding
the consent agreement, the Kass court treated the embryos as property to
30. See id. at 175 (detailing facts of case). During the course of their mar-
riage, Mr. and Mrs. Kass learned that they could not conceive children naturally
and decided to undergo in vitro fertilization. See id. at 175 (same). After several
failed pregnancies, Mr. and Mrs. Kass elected to undergo the procedure again, this
time first signing consent forms providing for the retrieval and fertilization of as
many eggs as possible in the same procedure, and for the cryopreservation, or
freezing, of extra embryos. See id. (same). The couple also signed an addendum
to the consent form that authorized the in vitro clinic to use the embryos for re-
search in the event that the couple no longer wanted to use the embryos to create
a pregnancy. See id. at 177 (same).
Three weeks after signing the forms, Mr. and Mrs. Kass wrote a divorce agree-
ment, which provided that the disposition of the frozen embryos would be gov-
erned by the consent form and subsequent addendum, and that neither Mr. nor
Mrs. Kass would seek custody of the embryos. See id. (same). A month later, Mrs.
Kass filed the present action for sole custody of the embryos so that she could use
them to undergo another in vitro implantation procedure. See id. (describing pro-
cedural history). Mrs. Kass's custody claim, however, was contrary to the terms in
the consent agreement and addendum, which provided for the in vitro clinic's
release of the embryos to research. See id. (describing provisions in consent agree-
ment and addendum).
31. See id. at 176 (discussing consent agreement). The relevant text of the
prior disposition agreement provides:
Our frozen [embryos] will not be released from storage for any purpose
without the written consent of both of us, consistent with the policies of
the IVF Program and applicable law. In the event of divorce, we under-
stand that legal ownership of any stored [embryos] must be determined
in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
32. See id. at 180 ("The central issue is whether the consents clearly express
the parties' intent regarding disposition of the [embryos] .... ").
33. See id. (holding contract law governed disposition of embryos).
34. See id. (analyzing content of consent agreement).
35. See id. at 182 (affirming New York Supreme Court's holding).
6
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be divided in the same manner as all other property in a divorce
settlement.
36
Other state courts have cited Kass in deciding similar disputes.
37
Moreover, several legal scholars have emphasized the Kass approach in the
disposition of frozen embryos in divorce cases. 38 The contractual mode of
analysis in determining the disposition of embryos depends on the idea
that they continue to be viewed as property.
39
A fairly recent Alabama case exemplifies a case in line with Kass and
the majority view. In Cahill v. Cahill,4° an Alabama court of appeals
treated frozen embryos as property.4 1 The dispute in Cahill involved a cus-
tody battle over frozen embryos that were left over from an in vitro proce-
dure.42 The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling
36. See id. at 179 (stating that embryos are not persons). The court stated that
there was no need to examine the issue of whether embryos are entitled to special
protections greater than those provided to all other types of property. See id. (not-
ing that facts of case do not implicate woman's right to privacy or bodily integrity).
The consent agreement providing that the embryos were to be divided in a prop-
erty settlement controlled here. See id. (indicating embryos are to be treated as
property for legal ownership purposes); see also Konsen, supra note 1, at 524 (stat-
ing that Kass court "explicitly den [ied] that the [embryos] were people, defining
them as something akin to property").
37. SeeJ.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 713 (N.J. 2001) (citing Kass, 696 N.E.2d at
174) (holding that formal, unambiguous contract, if present, should control dispo-
sition of frozen embryos); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 266 (Wash. 2002) (cit-
ing Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174) (concluding express agreement should control
disposition of embryos).
38. See Christina C. Lawrence, Procreative Liberty and the Preembryo Problem: Devel-
oping a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the Disposition of Frozen Preembryos, 52
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 721, 742 (2002) (arguing that "[i]f the couple cannot reach
an agreement, the [embryos] should remain in storage until they are no longer
viable. ... ); Noel A. Fleming, Comment, Navigating the Slippery Slope of Frozen
Embryo Disputes: The Case for a Contractual Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 345, 371
(2002) (arguing that "[t] he contract framework applied in Kass is a good example
of how the contractual approach should operate").
39. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 524 (asserting that contractual approach used
in Kass indicates court's view that embryos are property). Konsen also suggests
that "twenty-eight years of abortionfriendly [sic] pronouncements from the U.S.
Supreme Court" imply that most state courts view embryos as property, and not
life. Id. at 525; see also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 (stating that woman's right to pri-
vacy and bodily integrity are not implicated prior to implantation).
40. 757 So. 2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
41. See id. at 467 (discussing ownership of frozen embryos as between parties
of lawsuit). The court viewed the issue as which of the parties had a property
interest in the embryos, and notwhether the embryos were property. See id. (as-
suming embryos were property). The court applied contract law principles to ana-
lyze a prior disposition agreement and to determine which parties may have
acquired a property interest in the embryos. See id. at 467-68 (explaining analysis
undertaken by court).
42. See id. at 465-66 (stating facts). After failing to conceive naturally, Mr. and
Mrs. Cahill underwent an in vitro fertilization procedure at the University of Michi-
gan. See id. (same). Six embryos resulted from the procedure, three of which were
implanted in Mrs. Cahill's uterus and led to the birth of triplets and the other
three of which were frozen for later use. See id. (same). Mr. and Mrs. Cahill subse-
2004] NOTE
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that embryos are property, and the court stated that the embryos "shall
not be the property of either party," but rather that the university where the
embryos were stored "appears to be the current owner of the [em-
bryos].'43 Looking to the agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Cahill and the
university where the in vitro procedure was performed, the Alabama trial
court viewed the embryos as property to be divided just like other marital
property in a divorce settlement.
4 4
2. Federal Case Law
There is little federal case law that deals with the issue of the legal
status of embryos; however, federal courts have examined the issue on a
few occasions. In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,45 the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that there was no language in the Constitution that sup-
ported the view that life begins at conception. 46 The Roe Court analyzed
quently divorced, and Mrs. Cahill then filed a motion seeking to have the three
frozen embryos currently in storage at the University of Michigan awarded to her.
See id. (describing procedural history).
In a counterclaim, Mr. Cahill contended that the embryos were not property,
and thus should not be awarded as such to Mrs. Cahill. See id. (same). The trial
court rejected Mr. Cahill's argument and requested that both Mr. and Mrs. Cahill
produce a copy of the agreement signed by the couple and the University before
undergoing the procedure. See id. (same). Mr. Cahill complied with the request,
but Mrs. Cahill was unable to produce the agreement. See id. (same). Conse-
quently, the trial court held that the embryos remained the property of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. See id. (explaining trial court's holding).
43. See id. at 467 (viewing embryos as property in its holding). The court
stated that without Mrs. Cahill's cooperation in producing a copy of the agree-
ment-signed by her husband and the University of Michigan-the court could
not decide whether Mr. or Mrs. Cahill were the owners of the embryos. See id. at
467 (attempting to look to agreement to determine which party had ownership
rights to embryos). For this reason, the court held that the University of Michigan
was the owner of the embryos. See id. (explaining holding).
44. See Jennifer L. Enmon, Stem Cell Research: Is the Law Preventing Progress?,
2002 UTAH L. REv. 621, 638 (explaining that holding in Cahillwas representative of
view that embryos are to be treated as property).
Florida has also used marital property principles to govern the disposition of
frozen embryos in a divorce situation. See id. at 638-39 (treating embryos as prop-
erty). In Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, a state appellate court used a divorce media-
tion agreement to decide which of the couple should receive embryos that the
couple had previously frozen through an in vitro fertilization procedure. See 793
So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining reliance on mediation
agreement); Enmon, supra, at 638-39 (explaining reasoning in Valchine holding).
The Valchine court treated the frozen embryos as property and relied on property
division principles-here, those set forth in the divorce mediation agreement-to
control awarding of the embryos. See Valchine, 793 So. 2d at 1099 (explaining
court's reasoning); Enmon, supra, at 639 (explaining court's view of embryos as
property to be divided by property settlement agreement).
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. See id. at 162 ("In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law
as persons in the whole sense."). The Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a state violates a woman's constitutional right by enacting legislation that
criminalizes abortion. See id. at 129 (explaining issue presented in case). The
Court also addressed the issue of whether a fetus was a person and, therefore,
336 [Vol. 49: p. 329
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the word "person" in each context as it appeared in the Constitution and
concluded that from these contexts, the unborn were not persons for con-
stitutional purposes. 4 7 The Court in Roe therefore concluded that the un-
born did not have any constitutional right to life.
4 8
Another federal case that addressed the issue whether to categorize
embryos as persons or property is York v. Jones.49 In that case, the plaintiffs
were a husband and wife who had undergone an in vitro fertilization pro-
cess in Virginia.50 A year after the procedure, they attempted to transfer
the frozen embryo from the reproductive health center in Virginia, where
the embryo was currently being stored, to a reproductive health center in
Los Angeles, California. 5 1 The defendant-clinic refused the Yorks' trans-
fer request.5 2 The Yorks argued that prior to undergoing the procedure,
they had signed an informed consent form indicating that the embryo was
their property, and that they could decide how to dispose of it in the event
they did not want to implant it into Mrs. York's uterus.5 3
guaranteed a constitutional right to life. See id. at 156-57 (discussing whether fetus
was person). In his concurrence,Justice Stewart echoed the view that embryos and
fetuses were not yet "persons," referring to a fetus as "the potential human life
within her." Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to fetus living in utero).
47. See id. at 157 (explaining constitutional analysis of "person"). The Court
surveyed every instance in which the word "person" was referenced in the Constitu-
tion. See id. (noting all occurrences of "person" in Constitution). After this ex-
haustive inquiry, the Court concluded that "in nearly all these instances, the use of
the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application." Id.
48. See id. at 156-57 (rejecting argument that fetus is guaranteed right to life
under Due Process Clause). The Court expressly stated that the word "person," as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, did not include the unborn. See id. at 158
(describing Court's conclusions).
49. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
50. See id. at 424 (stating facts of case).
51. See id. (stating facts and nature of dispute). Mr. and Mrs. York underwent
an in vitro fertilization process, during which six eggs were removed from Mrs.
York's ovaries and fertilized. See id. (describing results of in vitro procedure). Five
of the six resulting embryos were transferred to Mrs. York's uterus, and the remain-
ing embryo was cryopreserved by the reproductive health center in Virginia where
the procedure was performed. See id.
52. See id. (stating facts).
53. See id. (stating facts). The informed consent form signed by the plaintiffs
provided, in relevant part:
We may withdraw our consent and discontinue participation at any time
without prejudice and we understand our [embryos] will be stored only
as long as we are active IVF patients at The Howard and Georgeanna
Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine or until the end of our normal
reproductive years .... Should we for any reason no longer wish to at-
tempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand we may choose one of three
fates for our [embryos] that remain in frozen storage. Our [embryos]
may be: 1) donated to another infertile couple . . .2) donated for ap-
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In refusing to release the embryo, the reproductive health center ar-
gued that it was not required to transfer the frozen embryo because trans-
ferring the frozen embryo to another clinic was not an option specifically
listed on the informed consent form that the Yorks had signed. 54 The
district court rejected the clinic's argument, finding that the informed
consent agreement signed by the plaintiffs "created a bailor-bailee rela-
tionship between the plaintiffs and defendants." 55 By analogizing the con-
sent agreement between Mr. and Mrs. York and the reproductive health
center to a bailor-bailee relationship, the York court determined that the
embryo was to be treated as property.
56
Federal courts have also addressed the issue whether embryos have
any legal rights of redress for injuries. 57 In Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales
Co.,58 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that
embryos were not entitled to bring claims for injury in tort because em-
bryos were "not entitled to the protections granted to persons." 59 Doe in-
volved a class action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged property
damage and personal injury to frozen embryos that they had planned to
store for later use.60 The plaintiffs were instead forced to discard the fro-
zen embryos due to the embryos' exposure to a potentially contaminated
batch of Human Albumin, a manufactured product. 6' The Doe court de-
cided that because embryos were not persons for constitutional purposes,
54. See id. at 425 (explaining defendant's argument). Specifically, the defen-
dant framed its defense in terms of plaintiffs' proprietary rights in the embryos,
contending that such rights were restricted to those three options listed on the
informed consent form. See id. (discussing Mr. and Mrs. York's property rights
with respect to embryos).
55. See id. (explaining nature and creation of bailor-bailee relationship).
56. See id. (stating that in order for bailor-bailee relationship to form, "all that
is needed 'is the element of lawful possession however created, and duty to ac-
count for the thing as the property of another that creates the bailment .
(quoting Crandall v. Woodward, 143 S.E.2d 923, 927 (Va. 1965))).
57. See, e.g., Santana v. Zilog, 95 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding non-
viable fetus cannot bring wrongful death action); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265,
1271 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that state does not have legitimate interest in pro-
tecting potential life until fetus has become viable); Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales
Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding embryos are not entitled to
recovery in tort).
58. 7 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998).
59. See id. at 743 (holding embryos could not recover for injuries). Mr. and
Mrs. Doe brought a class action suit against Irvine Scientific Sales Company, the
manufacturer of a product called Human Albumin, which is used in in vitro fertili-
zation procedures. See id. at 738 (describing procedural history of case). The
product was recalled after certain batches were contaminated with Creutzfeldt-Ja-
cob disease, a fatal neurological disease. Mrs. Doe underwent an in vitro fertiliza-
tion procedure. See id. at 739 (stating facts). Some of the resulting embryos were
implanted in her uterus and the rest were cryopreserved for later use. See id.
(same). Because the frozen embryos had been exposed to the recalled Human
Albumin, they had to be discarded. See id. (same).
60. See id. at 739 (stating facts).
61. See id. (stating facts).
[Vol. 49: p. 329
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"the embryos themselves [had] not suffered an actionable tort and Plain-
tiffs cannot bring such claim on their behalf."6
2
Another federal case, which contributes by analogy to the person-or-
property embryo debate, is Santana v. Zilog.63 In Santana, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a nonviable fetus could not
bring a wrongful death action. 64 The Ninth Circuit examined the views of
other state courts concerning whether a fetus may recover for wrongful
death. 6 5 The court stated that the view adopted by most state courts was
that viable fetuses could recover for wrongful death, but that nonviable
fetuses could not. 6 6 In adopting this majority view, the court noted that
,viability was a good measure to limit extension of wrongful death liability
because "until that point the fetus is not capable of sustaining an indepen-
dent, separate existence from its mother."6 7 This view applies by analogy
to law governing embryos: because embryos are younger in developmental
62. Id. at 742 (emphasizing that under Roe, "embryos are not entitled to the
protections granted to persons" (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973))).
Mr. and Mrs. Doe subsequently brought a class action suit in negligence against
Irvine Scientific Sales Co., claiming that Irvine's failure to withdraw the product
from the market or to warn of the potential contamination caused personal injury
and property damage. See id. (detailing negligence claims against Irvine Scientific
Sales Co.).
63. 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. See id. at 786 (holding nonviable fetus may not recover for wrongful
death). In this case, the plaintiffs sued defendant Zilog for wrongful death result-
ing from Mrs. Santana's employment at Zilog. See id. at 781 (stating facts). While
she worked for Zilog, a computer manufacturing facility, Mrs. Santana became
pregnant and miscarried six times. See id. at 782 (same). She and her husband
then sued Zilog for wrongful death of her six miscarried fetuses, alleging that Zilog
had exposed Mrs. Santana to dangerous chemicals and did not warn her of the
potential danger of the chemicals. See id. (stating nature of plaintiffs' claim against
Zilog).
65. See id. at 783 (discussing majority and minority views concerning whether
nonviable fetus is entitled to cause of action for wrongful death).
66. See id. (discussing majority view that tort liability may not be extended to
nonviable fetuses). At the time this case was decided, fifteen jurisdictions that al-
lowed recovery in tort for viable fetuses declined to extend the liability to non-
viable fetuses, and six jurisdictions did not recognize a cause of action in tort for
either viable or nonviable fetuses. See id. at 783 n.3 (listing jurisdictions that did
not allow nonviable fetus to recover in tort).
67. See id. (adopting majority view). The court analogized its reasoning to
that used in other courts in determining the point at which a fetus becomes a
person. See id. ("Courts use viability as the dividing line for 'personhood' because
it denotes the point at which the fetus, in essence, becomes a person, or a 'separate
entity capable of maintaining an independent action in its own right.'" (quoting
Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194, 197 (N.M. 1995))); see also Thibert v. Milka, 646
N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1995) ("There is no cause of action under [a] wrongful death
statute for the death of a child who was not viable at the time of injury and was not
born alive.").
11
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age than nonviable fetuses, embryos are afortiori nonviable and, therefore,
not able to bring a wrongful death action. 68
3. State Legislation Affecting Embryonic Stem Cell Research
Of the several states that have legislated on the issue of embryonic
stem cell research, Louisiana is by far the most restrictive of the re-
search. 69 Louisiana's statute defines an embryo that is not implanted in a
woman's uterus as a 'juridical person." 70 Louisiana prohibits the inten-
tional use and destruction of embryos under any circumstances. 7 1 Simi-
larly, South Dakota prohibits all research on human embryos that subjects
the embryos to "substantial risk of injury or death. '72 South Dakota also
prohibits the transfer of an embryo for use in research. 73 Minnesota has a
68. See National Institutes of Health, Fetal Development, at http://www.nlm.nih.
gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002398.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (explaining
that embryo becomes fetus at eight weeks post-fertilization).
69. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2003) (prohibiting embryo
research).
70. See id. § 9:123 ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical
person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb.").
Thus, Louisiana treats embryos that are used for stem cell research as persons, and
as such, those embryos are entitled to rights that are afforded to all other persons.
See id.; see also Enmon, supra note 44, at 644 (explaining Louisiana's restrictive
statute). Louisiana's statute is currently the only state statute that grants per-
sonhood status to embryos. See id. (recognizing Louisiana as only state to deem
embryos persons).
71. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 644 (interpreting Louisiana Statute); see also
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2003) (prohibiting destruction of embryos for
any purpose). The statute provides:
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall
not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or
through the actions of any other such person. An in vitro fertilized
human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period
except when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable
and is not considered a juridical person.
Id. (emphasis added).
Cryopreserved embryos are expressly excluded from Louisiana's exception to
its definition of nonviability. See id. (excluding frozen embryos from scope of stat-
ute); see also Enmon, supra note 44, at 644 (recognizing breadth of statute's prohi-
bition of destruction of embryos).
72. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-14-16 (Michie 2003) (prohibiting "nonthera-
peutic research that destroys a human embryo"); id. § 34-14-17 (prohibiting re-
search that "subjects a human embryo to substantial risk of injury or death").
73. See id. § 34-14-17 (prohibiting "transfer [of] a human embryo with the
knowledge that the embryo will be subjected to nontherapeutic research"). "Non-
therapeutic" is defined as "research that is not intended to help preserve the life
and health of the particular embryo subjected to risk." Id. § 34-14-19. South Da-
kota also prohibits research on cells obtained from destroyed embryos. See id. § 34-
14-18. By enacting this statute, South Dakota has effectively prohibited the use of
the existing stem cell lines for research, a step that even the President of the
United States has not taken. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 645 (noting South Da-
kota has denied procedures approved by President for advancement of medical
research); President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research
(Aug. 9, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-
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similar statute, which prohibits research on a human conceptus if the re-
search is harmful to the conceptus.7 4 In that statute, the term "human
conceptus" includes an in vitro fertilized human embryo. 75 Despite Min-
nesota's similar prohibition of only research that is harmful to the concep-
tus, the statute still prohibits embryonic stem cell research because
researchers must destroy embryos in order to obtain the stem cells.76
In contrast to the above statutory restrictions on research, New Hamp-
shire enacted a statute that suggests that research and experimentation on
embryos is legal. 77 In setting forth restrictions for the use of embryos, the
statute provides, "[n]o [embryo] shall be maintained ex utero in the non-
cryopreserved state beyond 14 days post-fertilization development" and
also that "no [embryo] that has been donated for use in research shall be
transferred to a uterine cavity." 78 Because these restrictions do not pro-
hibit research on embryos, New Hampshire implicitly permits research to
be performed on embryos. 79 Furthermore, because there are no qualifica-
tions on the word "research" in the New Hampshire statute, one can per-
suasively argue that New Hampshire permits research that involves the
destruction of embryos, such as stem cell research.
80
Pennsylvania's embryonic research statutes are similar to those of
New Hampshire. 8 1 Pennsylvania's statute is worded in such a manner that
2.html [hereinafter Bush Remarks] (permitting research on already created stem
cell lines).
74. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 2002) (criminalizing research on
human conceptus). The statute provides:
Subdivision 1. Penalty. Whoever uses or permits the use of a living
human conceptus for any type of scientific, laboratory research or other
experimentation except to protect the life or health of the conceptus, or
except as herein provided, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subdivision 2. Permitted act. The use of a living human conceptus for
research or experimentation which verifiable scientific evidence has
shown to be harmless to the conceptus shall be permitted.
Id.
Obviously, the exception in subdivision 2 does not include embryonic stem
cell research, because obtaining embryonic stem cells will result in the destruction
of the embryo. See Stem Cell Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (noting destruction of embryo
by removing stem cells).
75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421(2) (West 2002) (defining human concep-
tus). Human conceptus is defined as "any human organism, conceived either in
the human body or produced in an artificial environment other than the human
body, from fertilization through the first 265 days thereafter." Id.
76. See Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (explaining process of harvesting
stem cells from embryos and cessation of embryo development).
77. See N.H. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2002) (providing restrictions, but
not prohibitions, on use of embryos for research).
78. Id. (restricting use of embryos).
79. See id. (implying research on embryos is permitted under certain
circumstances).
80. See id. (providing no qualifications of term "research," thus implying that
embryonic stem cell research is permitted).
81. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 2003) (mentioning, but not
prohibiting, experimentation on embryos). The statute provides, in relevant part:
13
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demonstrates the state's acknowledgement and acceptance of embryo re-
search activities.8 2 Recently proposed legislation supports this interpreta-
tion.8 3 For example, in 2003 the Pennsylvania General Assembly
proposed two bills, the Stem Cell Research Act and the Stem Cell Research
Authorization Act.84 Both bills authorize the use of embryos from donors
who had leftover embryos from prior in vitro fertilization procedures and
who had agreed to donate those embryos specifically for obtaining stem
cells for research.
8 5
"All persons conducting, or experimenting in, in vitro fertilization shall file quar-
terly reports with the department." Id. Like New Hampshire's statute, the Penn-
sylvania statute suggests that embryo experimentation is legal in the state. See id.
(declining to expressly prohibit embryo experimentation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:15 (restricting, but not expressly prohibiting, embryo research).
82. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (suggesting experimentation on
embryos is permitted as long as quarterly reports are submitted to appropriate
state department). The statute thus implies that embryo research is not com-
pletely forbidden, provided that certain specific information is reported on a quar-
terly basis. See id. The information that the statute requires for the report is as
follows:
(1) Names of all persons conducting or assisting in the fertilization or
experimentation process.
(2) Locations where the fertilization or experimentation is conducted.
(3) Name and address of any person, facility, agency or organization
sponsoring the fertilization or experimentation except that names of any
persons who are donors or recipients of sperm or eggs shall not be
disclosed.
(4) Number of eggs fertilized.
(5) Number of fertilized eggs destroyed or discarded.
(6) Number of women implanted with a fertilized egg.
Id.
83. See Stem Cell Research Act, H.R. 422, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2003) [hereinafter Stem Cell Research Act] (proposing authorization of research
on embryonic and adult stem cells donated by in vitro patients); see also Stem Cell
Research Authorization Act, H.R. 945, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003)
[hereinafter Stem Cell Research Authorization Act] (proposing authorization of
embryonic stem cell research on embryos donated with consent from in vitro
patients).
84. See generally Stem Cell Research Authorization Act, supra note 83 (listing
date introduced to General Assembly as March 20, 2003); Stem Cell Research Act,
supra note 83 (listing date introduced to General Assembly as February 25, 2003).
85. See Stem Cell Research Authorization Act, supra note 83, § 4(a) (providing
for stem cell research on stem cells derived from embryos donated by in vitro pa-
tients); Stem Cell Research Act, supra note 83, § 3 (permitting "research involving
the derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells"). Sections 5 (b) and (c) of
the Stem Cell Research Act provide:
(b) Individual Options.-Any individual to whom information is pro-
vided pursuant to subsection (a) shall be presented with the option of
storing any unused embryos, donating them to another individual, dis-
carding the embryos or donating the remaining embryos for research.
(c) Written Consent.-Any individual who elects to donate embryos re-
maining after fertility treatments for research shall provide written
consent.
[Vol. 49: p. 329
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4. Federal Legislation on Embryo Research
In response to recent developments, Congress passed an amendment
to the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Service, and Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999; this amendment
banned federal funding of embryonic research.8 6 The amendment,
passed in 2000 and codified as the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2001, provides, in pertinent part:
None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for-
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research
purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are de-
stroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or
death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero
under . . . section 498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 2 8 9(g) (b)). 87
This proposed Act's companion bill, the Stem Cell Research Authorization
Act, is more specific. Its text provides, in relevant part:
(b) Written determination.-A written determination signed by the
progenitors that the embryo will never be implanted in utero and would
otherwise be discarded is required [in order to donate embryo to re-
search].... Reasonable efforts must be made to contact the progenitors.
(c) Written consent.-After the determination under subsection (b), the
written consent of the progenitors, if both are known, or the written con-
sent of the female progenitor, if only one is known, must be obtained for
embryo donation. If reasonable efforts to locate the progenitors fail, ap-
proval for embryo donation is presumed.
Stem Cell Research Authorization Act, supra note 83, § 4(b)-(c).
The Stem Cell Research Authorization Act contains a restriction not present
in theStem Cell Research Act. The former's restriction provides that "[h]uman
embryonic stem cell research may not result in the creation of human embryos for
reproductive purposes." Id. § 5.
86. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 510(a), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (prohibiting funds under this Act for embryo re-
search); see also Konsen, supra note 1, at 512 (predicting that House of Representa-
tives will reintroduce similar version of Act when it is time to reconsider Labor,
Health, and Human Services Appropriations Act). The language of the ban in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act is likely to be used in future amendments to re-
lated laws. See id. ("The fetal research statute forbids research or experimentation
on fetuses unless the activity enhances the well-being or meets the health needs of
the fetus, or enhances the probability of its survival to viability; or will pose no
added risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus.").
87. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 510(a) (noting prohibition of funding
for embryo research). Section 510(b) of the Act defines a human embryo as "any
organism ... that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other
means from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells." Id. § 510(b).
The Public Health Service Act prohibits research:
[O]n a nonviable living human fetus ex utero or a living human fetus ex
utero for whom viability has not been ascertained unless the research or
experimentation-
(1) may enhance the well-being or meet the health needs of the fetus
or enhance the probability of its survival to viability; or
2004] NOTE
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Thus, the current ban on human embryonic stem cell research effectively
"extends to embryos the protections given to fetuses in the United States
Code and the Code of Federal Regulations."88
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) added to
the growing controversy surrounding stem cell research when it issued an
interpretation of the recently enacted ban on stem cell research. 89 The
DHHS argued that the ban did not apply to embryonic stem cell research
because the ban was based on the belief that embryos are life and pluri-
potent stem cells are not yet capable of ,independently sustaining life. 90
Thus, because pluripotent stem cells were used in embryonic stem cell
research, embryonic stem cell research was not included in Congress's ban
on federal funding for embryo research. 91
The Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) subsequently
appeared before a Senate Appropriations Committee to testify as to the
DHHS statement. 92 In his address to the Senate, Director Harold Varmus
supported the DHHS argument:
(2) will pose no added risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus
and the purpose of the research or experimentation is the develop-
ment of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by
other means.
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a) (2003).
88. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 512 (explaining protections against research
offered to fetuses under Public Health Service Act). The Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act expressly applies the same risk standard to embryos as it does to fetuses-
the research must pose "no added risk of suffering, injury, or death" in order to be
eligible to receive federal funding. Id.; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act
§ 510 (a)(2) (explaining required risk standard for embryo research).
89. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 514 (explaining DHHS General Counsel's
statement of interpretation of ban on embryo research).
90. See id. (contending ban did not extend to embryonic stem cell research
because pluripotent cells are not human organisms).
91. See id. (concluding that embryonic stem cell research was not included in
congressional ban on funding for embryo research). The DHHS's argument was
based on moral grounds and formulated from the idea that "because pluripotent
stem cells obtained from destroyed embryos were not morally equivalent to em-
bryos themselves [in other words, the cells were not totipotent], ESCR [embryonic
stem cell research] was exempt from the federal funding ban." Id. at 515 (further
detailing DHHS's argument).
92. See Statement of Harold Varmus, NIH Director, before the Senate Appro-
priations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and
Related Agencies (Jan. 26, 1999), at http://stemcells.nih.gov/fedPolicy/statement.
asp (defending DHHS General Counsel's statement of interpretation of ban on
stem cell research). After providing a brief scientific background about the nature
and purpose of embryonic stem cells and stem cell research, Mr. Varmus's state-
ment outlined the advantages to allocating federal funding of embryonic stem cell
research. See id. (arguing for federal funding for embryonic stem cell research).
According to Mr. Varmus, "the most important reason [for providing federal fund-
ing for embryonic stem cell research] is the fact that Federal involvement creates a
more open research environment-with better exchange of ideas and data among
scientists." Id.
344 [Vol. 49: p. 329
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DHHS funds can be used to support.., research utilizing human
pluripotent stem cells because human pluripotent stem cells are
not embryos .... By this definition... pluripotent stem cells are
not and cannot develop into organisms. Therefore, human
pluripotent stem cells are not embryos and are not covered by
this prohibition on Federal funding.
93
5. The NIH Guidelines
In 2000, the NIH published guidelines for human stem cell research
(the "Guidelines"). 9 4 The Guidelines, aimed at regulating research on
pluripotent stem cells, were created to provide a list of the required condi-
tions for funding of research projects involving human embryonic stem
cells.9 5 Among other specifications, the Guidelines provide that federal
funding will not be used "to derive human pluripotent stem cells from
human embryos."9 6 Interestingly, differing somewhat from Mr. Varmus's
position in defense of the DHHS standard, the Guidelines include cells
derived from human embryos in the definition of pluripotent stem cells.
9 7
93. Id. (describing DHHS opinion). Mr. Varmus stated that the DHHS opin-
ion "relied on the broadly accepted science-based definition of organism: an indi-
vidual constituted to carry out all life functions." Id. Mr. Varmus argued that
pluripotent stem cells do not fit this definition because "pluripotent stem cells are
not and cannot develop into organisms." Id.
94. See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human
Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000), corrected by 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,951 (Nov. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Guidelines] (setting forth restrictions on
embryonic stem cell research); see also Cynthia Donley Young, A Comparative Look at
the US. and British Approaches to Stem Cell Research, 65 ALB. L. REv. 831, 846 (2002)
(discussing creation of NIH Guidelines). The Guidelines' purpose for expressly
prohibiting the derivation and research of stem cells from human embryos will be
especially significant "when products from stem cell lines will be capable of trans-
plantation into human subjects." Id. (explaining future significance of
Guidelines).
95. See Guidelines, supra note 94, at 51,979 (explaining Guidelines' intended
scope). The Guidelines are intended to apply to "the expenditure of National
Institutes of Health (NIH) funds for research using human pluripotent stem cells
derived from human embryos (technically known as human embryonic stem
cells)." Id.
96. See id. (explaining ineligibility for federal funding if project involves deriv-
ing human pluripotent stem cells from human embryos). The Guidelines further
state:
Studies utilizing pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos may
be conducted using NIH funds only if the cells were derived (without Fed-
eral funds) from human embryos that were created for the purposes of
fertility treatment and were in excess of the clinical need of the individu-
als seeking such treatment.
Id. (emphasis added). The Guidelines define pluripotent stem cells as "cells that
are self-replicating, are derived from human embryos or human fetal tissue, and
are known to develop into cells and tissues of the three primary germ layers." Id.
97. See id. at 51,979 (defining pluripotent stem cells).
2004] NOTE
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6. The President's Declaration and Compromise
In August 2001, President Bush gave a speech in which he announced
a compromise-he would allow federal funding for research on existing
embryonic stem cell lines. 98 A few weeks later, President Bush announced
that federal funding would not be provided for the derivation of new em-
bryonic cells, nor the creation of new stem cell lines. 99 President Bush's
decision was consistent with his own religious and moral convictions, but
was not necessarily based on any legal framework. °00 Despite widespread
agreement that the President's compromise was at least a small step to-
ward permitting embryonic stem cell research, critics have raised concerns
about the efficacy of embryonic stem cell research in light of the finite
supply of cell lines. 0 1
98. See Bush Remarks, supra note 73 ("I have concluded that we should allow
federal funds to be used for research on these existing stem cell lines, where the
life and death decision has already been made."). President Bush based much of
his determination to provide federal funding for research on stem cell lines that
were already in existence, but not to provide federal funding for the creation of
new stem cell lines for future research, on his religious and moral convictions. See
id. (explaining President's decision).
99. See National Institutes of Health (NIH), Update on Existing Human Embry-
onic Stem Cells (Aug. 27, 2001), at http:.//stemcells.nih.gov/news/082701list.asp
[hereinafter NIH Update] (explaining Bush's decision not to allow federal funding
for creation of new stem cell lines for embryonic stem cell research). The compro-
mise that President Bush announced was not unexpected. Even those in favor of
providing federal funding for all aspects of stem cell research conceded that the
President's decision was not the worst possible-at least he left the door somewhat
open for embryonic stem cell research to continue on a reduced level. See id. (dis-
cussing impact of President's compromise on future research).
100. See Bush Remarks, supra note 73 ("And while we must devote enormous
energy to conquering disease, it is equally important that we pay attention to the
moral concerns raised by the new frontier of human embryo stem cell research.").
See also Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Em-
bryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2001 /08/20010809-1. html (explaining President's rationale
for compromise). It was widely acknowledged that the President's decision was
"consistent with the President's belief in the fundamental value and sanctity of
human life." See id. (discussing President's moral views).
101. SeeYoung, supra note 94, at 847 (discussing criticism of President's com-
promise). The President's compromise has generated some specific concerns. See
id. at 847-48 (discussing concerns raised by President's compromise). One con-
cern is that the number of available stem cell lines is too low for adequate research
to be effectively performed. See id. (same). Another concern is that private com-
panies in possession of some of the stem cell lines in existence might be unwilling
to allow government funded researchers access to these existing lines. See id.
(same). Additionally, some scientists are concerned because, by some estimates,
the number of stem cell lines actually in existence and viable for use in research is
much lower than the estimate on which the President relied in reaching his deci-
sion. See id. (same).
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III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND FUNDING
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH
Proponents of stem cell research have advanced several arguments in
support of government funding of stem cell research. 10 2 One argument is
that the research provides medical advances and potential medical bene-
fits that greatly outweigh the damage done by the destruction of em-
bryos. 10 3 Research has shown that embryonic stem cells may provide
treatments for many debilitating and terminal diseases, such as Parkin-
son's disease, Alzheimer's disease, multiple sclerosis, certain types of can-
cer, Lou Gehrig's disease and diabetes. 10 4 Many people who suffer from
these diseases could stand to benefit. 10 5 Furthermore, stem cells may
102. See, e.g., Allison C. Ayer, Stem Cell Research: The Laws of Nations and a Propo-
sal for International Guidelines, 17 CONN. J. INrr'L L. 393, 414 (2002) (arguing embry-
onic stem cell research has great medical value); Erin George, The Stem Cell Debate:
The Legal, Political and Ethical Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific Research
on Human Embyos, 12 ALB. L.J. Sol. & TECH. 747, 791 (2002) (arguing that federal
funding of embryonic stem cell research is necessary in order for United States to
remain competitive in field of medical research and to treat debilitating diseases);
Carly Goldstein, Dipping into Uncle Sam's Pockets: Federal Funding of Stem Cell Research:
Is It Legal?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 229, 256 (2002) (arguing that federal funding of
embryonic stem cell research would facilitate governmental regulation of stem cell
research); Young, supra note 94, at 848 (arguing that United States should model
embryonic stem cell research funding policy after Britain's more permissive embry-
onic stem cell research policy).
103. See George, supra note 102, at 791-92 (explaining potential scientific and
medical benefits arising from stem cell research). Research shows that scientists
will be able to use stem cells to generate new, healthy cells of some part of the
human body and to use those cells to replace cells damaged by a particular disease.
See id. (explaining mechanisms by which embryonic stem cells could cure disease).
If stem cell research continues to progress, by some estimates, the resulting treat-
ments could be tested on patients within two or three years. See id. at 792 (estimat-
ing when patient clinical trials for embryonic stem cell therapy may begin).
104. See id. at 792 (listing ailments for which embryonic stem cell research
may provide treatment or cure); Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (listing types of
diseases that potentially can be treated and cured using stem cell therapy). The
list of diseases that could possibly be cured by stem cell therapy also includes ar-
thritis, AIDS, some types of heart disease, stroke and certain injuries such as burns
and brain and spinal cord injuries. See Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (specify-
ing types of diseases that could be treated with embryonic stem cell therapy).
105. See George, supra note 102, at 792 (estimating number of people in
United States afflicted with disease that embryonic stem cell research has potential
to treat or cure, and explaining that high numbers of Americans suffer from these
diseases); see also Food and Drug Administration, Alzheimer's: Searching for a Cure, at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/403_alz.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2003)
(estimating that four million Americans currently suffer from Alzheimer's dis-
ease); Mayo Clinic, Multiple Sclerosis, at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?
id=ds00188 (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (estimating that 400,000 Americans suffer
from multiple sclerosis); National Institutes of Health, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
Fact Sheet, at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health_andmedical/pubs/als.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2003) (estimating that 20,000 Americans suffer from ALS, also
known as Lou Gehrig's disease); National Institutes of Health, Diabetes Overview, at
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/overview/index.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2003) (estimating that seventeen million people in United States suffer from dia-
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eventually become a useful tool for testing pharmaceuticals and could pro-
vide a safer alternative to clinical trials of these drugs-trials that other-
wise involve human subjects. 10 6
Another argument in support of providing federal funding for stem
cell research is that the excess embryos will be destroyed and discarded
completely if they are not used for research purposes. 10 7 Over one hun-
dred thousand embryos are cryopreserved at fertility clinics throughout
the United States, and the reality is that most of these embryos will never
be transferred to a woman's uterus. 10 8 Thus, they will eventually be dis-
carded. 10 9 Supporters of embryonic stem cell research argue that if the
embryos are going to be discarded, using them for government-supported
stem cell research is a more productive purpose.110
By funding stem cell research, the United States will likely remain
competitive in a globalizing medical field."' This concern is particularly
valid given the fact that some countries regulate stem cell research more
liberally. 112 In light of these more permissive policies in other countries,
betes); National Institutes of Health, Parkinson's Disease Backgrounder, at http://
www.ninds.nih.gov/health and_medical/pubs/parkinson's-diseaseback-
grounder.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (estimating that at least 500,000 people
in United States currently suffer from Parkinson's disease).
106. See George, supra note 102, at 792 n.360 (providing additional examples
of usefulness of embryonic stem cell research); Stem Cell Information, supra note 10
(discussing alternative uses for embryonic stem cells, including testing of new
drugs).
107. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 254 (arguing that excess embryos that
are not used for stem cell research will go to waste).
108. See id. at 254-55 (explaining cause of excess embryos from in vitro proce-
dures). During a typical in vitro fertilization procedure, many eggs are removed
from a woman and fertilized, but usually only three or four of the resulting em-
bryos are placed back into her uterus. See id. (explaining in vitro procedure). The
remaining embryos are often cryopreserved for future use, but there are usually far
more embryos than would ever be needed for future in vitro procedures. See id. at
255 (explaining number of embryos resulting from in vitro procedure).
109. See id. (explaining problem of excess embryos). Women undergoing in
vitro procedures are given a choice of whether to cryopreserve the excess embryos
or to discard them. See id. Even women who choose cryopreservation eventually
decide they do not want any more pregnancies, and the embryos are subsequently
discarded. See id. (noting most excess embryos are ultimately discarded).
110. See id. at 255 (noting embryos will be destroyed anyway "and should be
used to help people" (quoting Editorial, Stem-Cell Research, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug.
27, 2000, at A, available at 2000 WL 27226151)).
111. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 624 (" [B] ecause research on human embry-
onic stem cells has been denied federal funding, human ES [embryonic stem] cell
research has been hindered in the United States, which has lagged behind other
countries' advances."); George, supra note 102, at 793 (explaining that allowing
funding to use embryos for stem cell research would "revolutionize medicine").
112. SeeYoung, supra note 94, at 848-49 (comparing U.S. policies on stem cell
research with Britain's policy and discussing Great Britain's more permissive stem
cell research policy). Because Great Britain allows scientists to obtain new stem
cells and create new stem cell lines, Great Britain's approach to stem cell research
is more permissive than the U.S. policy. See id. (arguing for more permissive em-
bryonic stem cell research policy similar to Great Britain's policy); see also The
[Vol. 49: p. 329
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the United States could conceivably lose its competitive edge in certain
areas of research. 13 For example, Great Britain permits embryonic stem
cell research in certain situations, such as where that research would lead
to improved treatments for disease.' 1 4 Advocates of using embryonic stem
cell research findings to cure diseases assert that American scientists are
likely to move to Great Britain so as to continue this research. 115 Simi-
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations, 2001, SI
2001/188 at 2, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010188.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Fertilisation Regulations] (governing issuance
of licenses to research embryos); Young, supra note 94, at 848-49, (citing Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, §§ 3(3)(a), 3(1), 3(4) (Eng.) [here-
inafter Fertilisation Act] (providing British government policy and regulations of
embryonic stem research)). The British legislature justifies allowing scientists to
create new stem cell lines because they believe the research is necessary for the
advancement of medicine and treatments for diseases; and this medical advance-
ment and the potential benefits it provides outweigh the fact that embryos will be
destroyed in the process. See Young, supra note 94, at 852-53 (explaining British
government's justification for embryonic stem cell research policy).
113. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 624 (asserting that lack of federal funding
has resulted in United States having decreased ability to compete with other coun-
tries' advances in embryonic stem cell research). Also, not allowing scientists to
extract new stem cells from embryos would result in the need to import stem cells
from sources in other countries, which would be far more expensive and time
consuming. See Young, supra note 94, at 852-53 (discussing concern about extra
expenses that potentially could be incurred by not permitting embryonic stem cell
research).
114. See Fertilisation Regulations, supra note 113 (providing circumstances in
which embryonic stem cell research is permitted). The regulations allow licensing
for stem cell research under the following circumstances:
(a) increasing knowledge about the development of embryos;
(b) increasing knowledge about serious disease or
(c) enabling any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments
for serious disease.
Id.
These regulations, however, place some limits on the use of embryos for re-
search. See id. For example, there must be written informed consent to the use of
the embryos for stem cell research. See Young, supra note 94, at 849 (citing Fer-
tilisation Act). The use of any embryo over fourteen days post-fertilization for re-
search is prohibited. See id. Despite these limitations, the Fertilisation Regulations
clearly address and permit stem cell research more permissively than the United
States. See id. (discussing overall permissive nature of Fertilisation Regulations, de-
spite limitations).
The British governmentjustifies a more permissive stem cell research policy in
order to ensure that British citizens benefit from the research as soon as possible.
See id. (advancing reasoning for permissive embryonic stem cell research policy).
To further this goal, British scientists must be able to readily derive stem cells from
embryos, instead of relying on imported embryonic stem cells from other coun-
tries. See id. at 852-53 ("[R]equiring British scientists to import embryonic stem
cells from other countries would make the research much more expensive and
time-consuming and could lead to obstacles in the progress of potentially invalua-
ble research.").
115. SeeYoung, supra note 94, at 853 (stating concern over American scientists
moving to Great Britain to do stem cell research because policy there is more per-
missive and funding is available). Despite the fact that the British policy on stem
cell research is more permissive than the U.S. policy, the British scientific commu-
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larly, China and Australia have policies that permit stem cell research to
some extent.' 
1 6
From a legal perspective, stem cell research should be permitted be-
cause embryos are not legal persons and, therefore, are not entitled to
those protections afforded to persons. 117 The Supreme Court expressed a
clear opinion on this issue in Roe v. Wade.118 Additionally, most state
courts that have addressed the issue have viewed frozen embryos as the
property of their progenitors.1 1 9 In light of these decisions, embryos
nity is also concerned that British scientists who currently perform embryonic stem
cell research will move to other countries that are even less restrictive than Great
Britain. See id. (explaining British government's concern over losing scientists).
This concern is advanced as one reason for Great Britain's permissive stem cell
research policy. See id. (discussing reasoning behind Great Britain's embryonic
stem cell research policy).
116. See George, supra note 102, at 770-71 (discussing Australia's and China's
stem cell research policies). Chinese researchers have developed human brain
stem cells that they plan to investigate for potential cures for Alzheimer's and Par-
kinson's diseases. See id. at 770 (discussing embryonic stem cell research under
Chinese policy). Australia's government has long supported in vitro fertilization
and is considering permitting embryonic stem cell research. See id. at 770-71 (out-
lining Australia's views on embryonic stem cell research).
Australia's policy on stem cell research is largely contained in the Infertility
Treatment Act of 1995. See Ayer, supra note 102, at 409 (citing Infertility Treat-
ment Act (1995) (Austl.)) (providing regulations of embryonic stem cell research
in Australia). The Infertility Treatment Act provides that embryos may be used for
research if the research itself is approved by the Australian government and if the
conducting scientist is a doctor authorized by the government to perform such
research. See id. (explaining Infertility Treatment Act). The Infertility Treatment
Act restricts research to only those embryos that have been formed for treatment
purposes, such as in an IVF procedure. See id. (analyzing Infertility Treatment
Act's limitation on embryonic stem cell research).
117. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (concluding unborn are not
persons); York v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (treating embryos as
property); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that in event of
divorce, frozen embryos are to be donated according to consent agreement previ-
ously signed by couple); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270-71 (Wash. 2002)
(using contract law to decide parental rights to embryos).
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (finding that "the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."). The Court referred to scien-
tific articles that viewed conception as a "process over time, rather than an event."
Id. at 161 (quoting Donald W. Brodie, The New Biology and the Prenatal Child, 9 J.
FAMILY L. 391, 397 (1970)). The Court specifically referenced in vitro fertilization
to illustrate this point. See id. (discussing medical view that life does not begin at
conception). The Court acknowledged that any legal interest the State might have
in protecting a fetus did not attach until the point at which the fetus became via-
ble, which the Court defined as a period between twenty-four and twenty-eight
weeks in gestational age. See id. at 160 (concluding nonviable fetus did not have
right to life). Because the embryos used for stem cell research are at an age of four
to five days post-fertilization, the question of viability will never be reached. See
Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (explaining age at which stem cells are removed
from embryos for research).
119. For a discussion of courts' views of embryos as property, see supra notes
19-68 and accompanying text.
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should be viewed as property.120 Therefore, the argument that funding
for stem cell research should be cut because embryos are entitled to ex-
traordinary legal protection lacks precedential support.12 1
From an institutional standpoint, there are strong arguments in favor
of the U.S. government's funding and regulating of stem cell research. 122
By giving up its power to regulate stem cell research, the government
could conceivably be opening the door to private companies' eventual
"unsafe, black market operations" in the field of stem cell research. 12 3 If
the government does not provide regulations on stem cell research, it is
effectively "handing over its power to ensure that embryonic stem cell re-
search is not abused." 124 Therefore, it is in the government's best interest
to provide funding for stem cell research. 12 5 Moreover, Congress should
fund stem cell research in order to utilize the regulatory power of federal
agencies, which can effectively regulate its inevitable development. 126
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERAL REGULATION AND FUNDING
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH
There are several arguments against federal regulation and funding
for stem cell research. One of the most prominent arguments derives
from religious beliefs that life begins at conception, and, therefore, de-
stroying embryos for the purpose of obtaining stem cells is murder.
12 7
120. For arguments in favor of the view that embryos are more like property
than persons, see supra notes 29-68 and accompanying text.
121. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (holding that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn"); York, 717 F. Supp. at 425
(treating embryos as property by holding embryos were subject matter of bailor-
bailee relationship); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (concluding that contract principles
should govern disposition of embryos).
122. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 256 (noting concern created by federal
government's refusal to regulate and fund stem cell research). Providing funding
for stem cell research is critical, because providing funds also opens the door for
the federal government to regulate stem cell research on a national level. See id.
(articulating impact that providing funding of embryonic stem cell research would
have on government's ability to regulate research).
123. See id. (presenting potential "parade of horribles" accompanying unregu-
lated stem cell research).
124. See id. (discussing need for federal government to keep close regulatory
eye on procedures and progress of stem cell research). By refusing to provide
federal funding and regulation of stem cell research, there is a very real concern
that the private companies who currently perform the research will disregard any
safeguards or ethical concerns over the research, in the interest of continuing to
make profits. See id. (discussing potential problems resulting from government's
continued refusal to regulate embryonic stem cell research).
125. See id. (discussing need for federal funding for embryonic stem cell
research).
126. See id. ("With the denial of federal funds to support pluripotent stem cell
research comes the inability to regulate such embryonic sem [sic] cell research.").
127. See George, supra note 102, at 782 (explaining religious and pro-life
groups' objections to embryonic stem cell research). Many religious and pro-life
organizations are so staunchly opposed to the destruction of embryos that they
2004] NOTE
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Those who oppose stem cell research on religious grounds believe that
destroying one human life to help save many others is never justified.' 28
For example, Roman Catholics advocate the position that every embryo
"holds independent moral status and should have the same rights that all
living people have."'
29
In an effort to promote alternatives to stem cell research, embryo
adoption programs have been established in order to provide couples an
option for disposing of the excess embryos without having them de-
stroyed. 130 One of these programs, developed by Nightlight Christian
Adoptions, uses traditional adoption procedures to match potential par-
ents with donated embryos. 131 The Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Pro-
gram is designed to give embryos that would otherwise be thrown away a
chance at "life." 13
2
Another argument in opposition to stem cell research is that using
embryos to obtain stem cells is simply unnecessary because there are other
have stated "some diseases are better than their cure [s]." Id. at 783 (quoting Edu-
cation and Related Agencies Holds Hearing on Stem Cell Research: Hearing on Stem Cell
Research Before the S. Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Serws. (Sept. 14, 2000) (statement of Pastor Russell Saltzman), available at 2000 WL
1364369)).
128. See George, supra note 102, at 782-83 (explaining pro-life argument). To
further this argument, "[r]eligious and pro-life leaders urge people to remember
that we were all once embryos and fetuses." Id.
129. See Ayer, supra note 102, at 399 (explaining Roman Catholic position
that "when genetic material is joined there is a unique potential for life," so em-
bryos must be afforded same moral status as people). It is worth noting, however,
that all religions do not embrace this view. See id. at 400 (explaining other relig-
ious teachings regarding moral status of embryos). Judaism dictates that embryos
do not have any moral status until they have been implanted in the uterus for forty
days. See id. (explaining Jewish teachings). Islamic tradition does not ascribe any
status to embryos until an even later time of fetal development-the end of the
fourth month of pregnancy. See id. (explaining Islamic teachings). Pursuant to
these religions' prescriptions, stem cell research does not present a moral dilemma
with respect to the destruction of embryos because the cells are obtained about
four to five days post-fertilization, well before either of these time periods. See id.
(arguing that embryonic stem cell research does not violate teachings of all
religions).
130. See Naomi D. Johnson, Excess Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption a New Solution or
a Temporary Fix?, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 871 (2003) ("For people who view life as
beginning at conception, embryo adoption provides the only answer to the disposi-
tional issue."). One of the first private embryo adoption programs was developed
by Nightlight Christian Adoptions. See id. at 859 (discussing embryo adoption
programs).
131. See Snowflakes, Message to Genetic Parents, at http://www.snowflakes.org/
Genetic.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (explaining Snowflakes Embryo Adoption
Program). However, no state has developed a body of law regarding embryo adop-
tion, but parents are required to sign the same binding relinquishment documents
and adoption agreements as are adoptive parents of children, and these contracts
are also binding upon the parties in an embryo adoption. SeeJohnson, supra note
130, at 860 (discussing legality of embryo adoption).
132. SeeJohnson, supra note 130, at 860-61 (discussing philosophy for embryo
adoption program).
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sources of stem cells that do not involve having to destroy any living
cells. 133 Preliminary research has indicated that various tissues from the
adult human body may be able to provide stem cells for eventual use in
different types of therapy in many of the same respects as embryonic stem
cells can. 134 The medical community, including the NIH, has responded
to this argument by specifying the important differences between adult
and embryonic stem cells. 13 5 Specifically, embryonic stem cells are availa-
ble in much greater quantities, and are pluripotent, meaning that they are
capable of differentiating into any cell in the human body. 136 According
to the NIH, these aspects of embryonic stem cells make them more appro-
priate than adult stem cells for use in research and resulting therapies.
13 7
Nevertheless, the preference for embryonic stem cells over adult stem cells
has been disputed, with some evidence suggesting that adult stem cells are
just as effective as embryonic stem cells.1 38 Therefore, according to some
133. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 535 (explaining other sources of stem cells
for research). Some of the other areas of the adult human body where stem cells
have been isolated and removed include the nervous system, muscle, certain parts
of the eye, pancreas and bone marrow. See id. at 536 (listing sources of adult stem
cells); see also Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (explaining possible sources of
adult stem cells). According to the NIH, stem cell research using adult stem cells
has also been successful. See id. (explaining possibility of using adult stem cells for
research). Moreover, research on adult stem cells is not a new development. See
id. (discussing history of adult stem cell research). Forty years ago, studying adult
bone marrow, scientists were able to identify two types of stem cells: (i) hematopoi-
etic stem cells, which are the basis for all types of human blood cells and (ii) bone
marrow stromal cells, which are the basis for bone, cartilage, fat and connective
tissue. See id. (identifying two known types of adult stem cells). Stem cells taken
from adult blood have already been used over the past thirty years as a basis for
bone marrow transplants. See id. (noting relatively long history of bone marrow
transplants for treatment of disease).
134. See Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (identifying examples of treatment
shown to be effective by preliminary research on adult stem cells). Research on
adult stem cells has shown that stem cells may eventually be used to grow heart
cells, muscle cells and dopamine-producing cells. See id. (explaining embryonic
stem cells' potential for replacing diseased cells). Based on this research, adult
stem cells could be used in transplanting various organs and bone marrow, devel-
oping cells that produce insulin in diabetes patients and growing heart muscle
cells to replace damaged cells resulting from a heart attack. See id. (discussing
medical uses for embryonic stem cells).
135. See id. (explaining differences between adult and embryonic stem cells).
136. See id. (contrasting adult and embryonic stem cells).
137. See id. (explaining preference for using embryonic stem cells in
research).
138. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 536-37 (contradicting NIH's position that
embryonic stem cells are preferable for stem cell research, despite resulting de-
struction of embryo). Several studies have demonstrated the success researchers
have had with adult stem cells. See id. (discussing successful research on adult stem
cells). Scientists have discovered and isolated adult stem cells from almost all of
the areas of the human body. See id. (discussing progress made in adult stem cell
research). Additionally, research on adult mouse stem cells has shown that those
stem cells were able to grow into brain, spinal cord, stomach, liver, intestinal and
heart cells. See id. (citing Christopher R. R. Bjornson et al., Turning Brain into
Blood: A Hematopoietic Fate Adopted by Adult Neural Stem Cells In Vivo, 283 Sci. 534
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members of the scientific community, there is no medical necessity, nor
therapeutic benefit to using embryonic stem cells for research. 139
Legally, opponents of stem cell research rely on the Tennessee Su-
preme Court's decision in Davis as support for their argument that stem
cell research should not be allowed. 140 As the reader recalls, the Davis
court stated that embryos are potential life and, thus, entitled to certain
protections. 14 1 In addition, some states have enacted legislation that re-
stricts or prohibits stem cell research. 142
Current federal statutes that address fetal research would seem to ban
embryonic stem cell research as well.' 43 Further, through an amendment
to the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Congress enacted a ban
(1999)) (discussing stem cell transplantation). Another line of research showed
that adult bone marrow stem cells successfully generated brain cells. See id. (citing
Gene C. Kopen et al., Marrow Stromal Cells Migrate Throughout Forebrain and Cerebel-
lum, and They Differentiate into Astrocytes After Injection into Neonatal Mouse Brains, 96
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10711 (1999)) (discussing use of adult stem cells to
create brain cells). Further research showed that adult blood stem cells were capa-
ble of producing adult muscle cells and, conversely, that adult muscle stem cells
could produce adult blood cells. See id. (citing Emanuela Gussoni et al., Dystrophin
Expression in the MDX Mouse Restored by Stem Cell Transplantation, 401 NATURE 390
(1999) (discussing results of studies indicating hematopoietic cells can produce
myocytes); Kathyjo Ann Jackson et al., Hematopoietic Potential of Stem Cells Isolated
from Murine Skeletal Muscle, 96 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S.A. 14482 (1999) (discuss-
ing potential for stem cells obtained from adult muscle tissue to produce blood
cells)).
139. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 535 (arguing that "[embryonic stem cell re-
search] is not necessary in light of recent scientific discoveries concerning stem
cells taken from non-embryonic sources").
140. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that em-
bryos are potential life and deserve special protection due to that status); Konsen,
supra note 1, at 530 (explaining courts' variations in decisions about embryos' po-
tential personhood). For a further discussion of courts' varying views on embryos'
personhood, see supra notes 19-68 and accompanying text.
141. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588 (stating embryos were entitled to "special
respect because of their potential for human life"). It should be noted that the
Davis court abstained from specifying precisely what protections should be af-
forded to embryos. For a discussion of Davis, see supra notes 22-28 and accompa-
nying text.
142. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2003) ("No in vitro fertilized
human ovum will be farmed or cultured solely for research purposes. . . ."); id. §
9:126 (suggesting in vitro embryo has rights); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (West 2002)
(setting penalty for "laboratory research or other experimentation except to pro-
tect the life or health of the conceptus" as gross misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 34-14-16 (Michie 2003) ("No person may knowingly conduct nontherapeu-
tic research that destroys a human embryo."); id. § 34-14-17 ("No person may
knowingly conduct nontherapeutic research that subjects a human embryo to sub-
stantial risk of injury or death.").
143. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 289g (1993) (prohibiting re-
search on nonviable human fetuses outside uterus unless research "may enhance
the well-being or meet the health needs of the fetus or enhance the probability of
its survival to viability"). For the relevant text of the Public Health Service Act, see
supra note 87.
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on federal funding of any type of research involving the destruction of
embryos. 144 Advocates against stem cell research contend that this ban on
embryo research implies that embryos are to be afforded certain legal pro-
tections-the same legal protections to which fetuses are entitled.1 4 5
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION REGULATING AND
FUNDING STEM CELL RESEARCH AND PROPOSAL OF MODEL LEGISLATION
Despite arguments made to the contrary, embryonic stem cell re-
search appears to be growing in frequency and popularity. 146 Many view
this trend as a necessary and important step to be taken in the area of
medicine. 147 Based on the view that most courts have taken, treating em-
bryos as property and not as persons, embryonic stem cell research should
not present any legal obstacles in terms of embryo rights. 148 Federal law
144. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 510(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (prohibiting providing federal funds for re-
search on embryos). For the relevant text of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
see supra note 87; see also Konsen, supra note 1, at 512 (describing Consolidated
Appropriations Act).
145. See Konsen, supra note 1, at 512 ("The current embryonic research ban
extends to embryos the protection given to fetuses in the United States Code and in
the Code of Federal Regulations."). The restrictions on fetal research also include the
requirement that the research must "seek to meet the health needs of the fetus
while minimizing risk, and always ensuring that the experiments pursue important
biomedical knowledge that cannot be obtained by other means." Id. at 513. By
including the same language and risk requirements in the current embryonic re-
search ban, the federal government intended to protect embryos under the law in
the same way that it protects fetuses. See id. (arguing embryonic research ban enti-
tles embryos to same status and protections as fetuses).
146. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 256 ("With or without the support of the
federal government, pluripotent stem cell research will continue.").
147. See id. (explaining growing trend of embryonic stem cell research). If
the federal government does not regulate and fund embryonic stem cell research,
private companies and laboratories who already do the research will not be de-
terred, and will continue their research. See id. (explaining need for federal regu-
lation of stem cell research). By refusing to fund embryonic stem cell research,
the federal government will in effect be refusing the chance to closely monitor
stem cell research and its results. See id. (explaining need for federal funding and
regulation). For a more detailed discussion of the concerns over the government's
failure to regulate stem cell research, see supra notes 122-26 and accompanying
text.
148. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (stating that unborn are not
persons in eyes of Constitution); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va.
1989) (finding that frozen embryos were property subject to bailor-bailee relation-
ship); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (treating frozen em-
bryos as property subject to property settlement at time of divorce); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (emphasizing rights of parents to decide
whether to implant embryos and become parents);J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719
(N.J. 2001) (treating embryos as property); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y.
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should encourage and fund embryonic stem cell research because of the
many benefits that scientific research on embryos provides. 149
Banning federal funding for the derivation of new embryonic stem
cell lines, but continuing to provide it for stem cell lines already in exis-
tence, inadequately fosters medicinal research. 150 Rather, legislation
should be drafted to fund embryonic stem cell research on new cell lines,
subject to specific regulations and restrictions. 15 1 Congress should model
the legislation after several examples: the New Hampshire statute that ad-
dresses embryo research, a proposed bill in Pennsylvania that addresses
embryo research and Great Britain's policy on stem cell research.' 5 2 Addi-
tionally, the legislation should reflect the view that embryos are property, a
149. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 647 (arguing for federal policy providing
funding for embryonic stem cell research). Without funding from the federal gov-
ernment, research will likely not be as productive as it would with the govern-
ment's approval. See id. (discussing benefits of policy permitting federal funding of
stem cell research). Without federal funding, it is possible that more stem cell
lines will not be created, thereby hindering progress made by stem cell research.
See id. (discussing concerns over current funding ban).
Further, a policy providing federal funding for embryonic stem cell research
would eliminate the government's need to rely on private companies and foreign
medical research to provide the stem cell lines necessary for the research. See id.
(explaining advantages of federal funding of stem cell research). Because the
stem cell lines that do exist were derived by private companies or researchers in
foreign countries, there is a possibility that the federal government's researchers
will not have full access to all of the stem cell lines, again slowing down the pro-
gress of the research. See id. (explaining need for federal funding to remain com-
petitive in medical research). All of these concerns warrant federal funding and
legislation in the area of embryonic stem cell research. See id. at 547-48 (outlining
reasons for federal funding and legislation).
150. See Bush Remarks, supra note 73 (explaining compromise on federal fund-
ing for embryonic stem cell research); see also Enmon, supra note 44, at 647 (ex-
plaining that "a policy funding the establishment of embryonic stem cell lines from
excess IVF embryos may have been the wiser choice" than compromise presented
by President Bush). Moreover, because embryonic stem cell research continues to
provide many hopes for possible treatments for life-threatening diseases, the gov-
ernment's position prevents those benefits from reaching individuals who need
them. See id. (discussing need for access to stem cell therapy).
Nevertheless, President Bush's compromise did not completely preclude
funding for all embryonic stem cell research. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 647
("Although President Bush's policy is far from revolutionary, it has at least un-
locked the door to medical research previously denied funding."). By announcing
that the government would continue to support stem cell research using pre-ex-
isting embryonic stem cell lines, President Bush did not completely eradicate fund-
ing for all embryonic stem cell research. See id. (explaining compromise
permitting funding for limited research). In this way, he at least allowed a portion
of the research to continue, although not as freely as the medical community
would have preferred. See id. (discussing shortcomings of current compromise).
151. See Enmon, supra note 44, at 647 (arguing in favor of extending federal
funding to create new embryonic stem cell lines).
152. See id. (arguing for funding of stem cell research based on more permis-
sive policy).
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view consistent with that taken by a majority of U.S. state and federal
courts. 153
Among the states that have addressed the issue of embryo research,
New Hampshire's statute is the best model for federal legislation because
it encourages embryonic stem cell research. 154 The fourteen-day post-fer-
tilization age limit that the statute imposes is a reasonable restriction that
Congress should include in federal legislation. 15 5 Moreover, the statute
contains an assumption of informed consent by the donor.156 Thus, the
New Hampshire statute is a good model for federal legislation because it
permits research subject to certain important restrictions-namely, that
the embryos used may not be over fourteen days post-fertilization and that
the embryos must be donated specifically for research purposes. 1 57
Another guide in developing federal legislation for funding and regu-
lation of embryonic stem cell research is a proposed bill pending in the
Pennsylvania state legislature. 158 Like the New Hampshire statute, the
proposed Stem Cell Research Authorization Act purports to permit embry-
onic stem cell research under certain circumstances.15 9 The bill expands
153. See generally N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15(I) (2002) (providing restric-
tions on embryo research); Fertilisation Regulations, supra note 113 (defining em-
bryo research and how it may be performed); Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (concluding that
U.S. Constitution does not recognize unborn as persons); York, 717 F. Supp. at 425
(holding that embryos are property and are to be treated as such for purposes of
divorce); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174 (holding that contract law principles are to be
applied in disposition of excess frozen embryos in event of divorce); Stem Cell
Research Authorization Act, supra note 83, §§ 2-7 (proposing guidelines permit-
ting embryonic stem cell derivation and research).
154. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15(I) (2002) (addressing embryo re-
search). For the relevant text of the statute, see supra text accompanying note 78.
The statute does not address the issue of whether stem cell research is permitted in
the state; rather, it implies that embryonic stem cell research is permitted on em-
bryos donated for research that are under fourteen days post-fertilization. See id.
(implying that embryo research is permitted); see also supra notes 77-80 and accom-
panying text.
155. See Stem Cell Information, supra note 10 (explaining best age of embryos
for removal of stem cells for research is four to five days post-fertilization); see also
Young, supra note 94, at 849 (explaining that Great Britain's stem cell research
policy permits research and stem cell derivation from embryos up to fourteen days
post-fertilization).
156. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (II) (2002) ("No preembryo that has
been donated for research shall be transferred to a uterine cavity."). This subsec-
tion implies that embryos used for research must be donated for that specific pur-
pose and are not to be used for any other purposes, such as implantation into a
uterus. See id. (permitting embryos to be used for research if they have been
donated specifically for such purpose).
157. See id. (providing restrictions on using embryos for research).
158. See Stem Cell Research Authorization Act, supra note 83, §§ 4-6 (propos-
ing legislation permitting embryonic stem cell derivation and research).
159. See id. §§ 3-4 (providing conditions under which research may take
place). The sections provide, in relevant part:
Section 3. Human embryonic stem cell generation and research.
Scientists engaged in the use of previously derived embryonic stem cells
shall not be considered to have destroyed human embryos.
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the New Hampshire statute in two important respects. First, the bill specif-
ically defines the term "embryo" and the phrase "embryonic stem cell."' 60
Second, the bill requires that researchers only use embryos donated by
fertility clinics, accompanied by a determination signed by the progenitors
that the embryos would not be implanted in a uterus to become a human
fetus and would otherwise be discarded if they were not donated to
research. 161
Great Britain's policy on stem cell research provides a more permis-
sive model than any currently existing or proposed legislation in the
United States. 16 2 Two documents-the Human Embryology and Fertilisa-
tion Act of 1990 and The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research
Purposes) Regulations-embody the policy. 163 Similar to the New Hamp-
Section 4. Sources of embryonic stem cells
(a) General rule.-For purposes of carrying out research under section 3,
the human embryonic stem cells involved shall be derived only from em-
bryos that have been donated from public or private fertility clinics after
compliance with all of the requirements of this section.
(b) Written determination.-A written determination signed by the
progenitors that the embryo will never be implanted in utero and would
otherwise be discarded is required. The written determination can only
occur prior to consideration of embryo donation and after consultation
with an independent party by the progenitors, if both are known and
available or by the female progenitor, if only one of the progenitors is
known. Reasonable efforts must be made to contact the progenitors.
(c) Written consent.-After the determination under subsection (b), the
written consent of the progenitors, if both are known, or the written con-
sent of the female progenitor, if only one is known, must be obtained for
embryo donation. If reasonable efforts to locate the progenitors fail, ap-
proval for embryo donation is presumed.
Id.
160. See id. § 2 (providing definitions of key terms). The term "embryo" and
the phrase "embryonic stem cell" are defined by section 2 of the Act as follows:
"Embryo." An individual organism of the species Homo sapiens that is
comprised of an oocyte which has been fertilized through the introduc-
tion of sperm and which has at present the capacity to develop in utero
into a human fetus. The term shall include organisms that are fertilized
ex vivo and in vivo. Organisms with morphological similarity to an em-
bryo but which were not created with germ line cells from two human
progenitors shall not be considered to be an embryo. This definition
shall only apply to embryos existing outside the uterus.
"Embryonic stem cell." A cell that originates from the inner cell mass of a
human embryo and has the potential to develop into all or nearly all of
the tissues in a human body, the potential known as pluripotentiality.
Id.
161. See id. § 4 (discussing sources of embryonic stem cells and circumstances
under which embryonic stem cells may be obtained). For the full text of section 4,
see supra note 159.
162. See generally Fertilisation Regulations, supra note 113 (defining embryo
research and how it may be performed).
163. See Young, supra note 94, at 848 (explaining that Britain's policy is con-
tained in Fertilisation Act and Fertilisation Regulations). Britain's policy on stem
cell research is considerably more permissive than that of the United States. See id.
(outlining British policy). While the policy itself permits more research than the
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shire statute and the proposed Stem Cell Research Authorization Act, the
British policy emphasizes restrictions such as the fourteen-day post-fertili-
zation age limit for the embryos and a strict informed consent require-
ment.164 Most importantly, unlike any of the U.S. legislation, the British
regulations expressly permit embryonic stem cell research. 165
In addition to the above-mentioned principles, Congress should in-
corporate the courts' views of embryos as property as justifications for the
United States, the British government has kept a closer eye on the stem cell re-
search processes than the United States. See id. at 852-53 (contrasting American
and British embryonic stem cell research policies). Among the British policy's re-
quirements, the Act provides that scientists wishing to conduct embryonic stem cell
research must apply for a license from the British government and submit all re-
search proposals to a government-appointed peer group for review and approval
before that research can take place. See id. at 849 (detailing British policy regula-
tions). Additionally, the government has published a code of practice by which
scientists must abide when doing their research in order to retain their licenses.
See Ayer, supra note 102, at 407 (outlining requirements of British stem cell re-
search policy).
164. See Young, supra note 94, at 849 (citing Fertilisation Act for proposition
that embryos may not be used for research past age of fourteen days post-fertiliza-
tion or until primitive streak appears, whichever occurs first). The Act also pro-
vides that embryos may not be cryopreserved for more than five years unless
specified differently in the license. See id. (explaining provisions in Fertilisation
Act).
Regarding informed consent, the Act has very stringent requirements. See id.
at 849-50 (discussing informed consent requirements); see also Ayer, supra note
102, 408-09 (discussing informed consent requirements). The text of the Act pro-
vides that donor informed consent is valid only if the following requirements have
been met:
(a) [The donor] must be given a suitable opportunity to receive proper
counseling about the implications of taking the proposed steps, and
(b) [The donor] must be provided with such relevant information as is
proper.
Id.
There is still some dispute among clinics in Britain over the meaning of "rele-
vant information," but the informed consent requirement is clearly present in
some form in the Fertilisation Act. See Ayer, supra note 102, at 408-09 (discussirig
components of informed consent requirement); Young, supra note 94, at 850 (ex-
plaining varying detail of information required).
165. See Fertilisation Regulations, supra note 113 (providing embryonic stem
cell research may be performed for certain specific purposes). The Regulations
provide three purposes for which embryonic stem cell research is permitted:
(a) increasing knowledge about the development of embryos;
(b) increasing knowledge about serious disease; or
(c) enabling any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments
for serious disease.
Id.
The Regulations were enacted specifically for the purpose of broadening the
allowable reasons for embryonic stem cell research. See Young, supra note 94, at
848-49 (explaining purpose of Regulations). Because they focus on increasing
knowledge about serious disease and treatment of serious disease, the Regulations
are applicable to stem cell research and take a very permissive view of the research.
See id. at 849 (explaining application of Regulations to embryonic stem cell
research).
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legislation.' 6 6 Only one court, the Tennessee Supreme Court, has ever
specifically found that embryos represent "potential for life" and, as such,
are entitled to "special respect."' 67 Even that court, however, declined to
call embryos "persons" or to declare that embryos were entitled to certain
legal rights that protected them from harm.1 68 The majority of the state
and federal courts that have examined the issue of how to treat embryos
take the view that embryos are property or, alternatively, are not "persons"
for constitutional purposes.' 69 The courts' willingness to use contract law
to govern disputes over the disposition of embryos in divorce situations
bolsters this position. 17
0
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government should provide funding for embryonic stem cell
research for several reasons. Most importantly, the government should
fund embryonic stem cell research in order to remain competitive in the
field of medicine and disease treatment.1 7 1 Allowing this research to be
regulated at a state level does not accomplish this goal because state poli-
cies on embryonic stem cell research differ drastically from state to
state. 172 Regulation on a national level will ensure consistency among the
states and better enable the United States to compete globally in the race
for medical breakthroughs that may derive from embryonic stem cell re-
166. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (concluding that Constitution
does not recognize unborn as persons); York v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (holding that embryos are property and are to be treated as such for
purposes of divorce).
167. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) ("We conclude that
[embryos] are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
human life."). The Davis court also acknowledged the possibility that an embryo
may never realize its biologic potential." Id. at 596.
168. See id. at 597 (acknowledging that embryos deserve "special protection,"
but declining to explain specific examples or meaning of "special protection").
6 169. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 (finding that Constitution does not intend for
unborn to be included in definition of person); York, 717 F. Supp. at 425 (treating
embryos as property); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465, 467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)
(advocating contractual approach to resolving embryo dispute in event of
divorce).
170. See Cahill, 757 So. 2d at 467 (treating embryos as property by framing
issue as which party had, by contract, created property interest in embryos); Kass v.
Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998) (implying embryos are property by applying
contract law to disposition of frozen embryos during divorce proceedings, in same
way as applies to property settlements). For a further discussion of Kass, see supra
notes 29-36 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Cahill, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of the argument that refusing to provide federal fund-
ing for stem cell research will severely undermine the ability of the United States to
compete in the field of medical research, see supra notes 112-16 and accompany-
ing text.
172. For examples of differing state legislation on embryo research, see supra
notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
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search.1 73 In light of the above, Congress should replace the current ban
on funding for embryonic stem cell research with a more permissive
policy. 174
VII. POSTSCRIPT
Since the writing of this Note, two states have taken significant steps
toward the advancement of stem cell research. 175 In February 2004, the
governor of NewJersey included in his state budget plan an allocation of
$6.5 million to build a research institute dedicated to stem cell re-
search.176 This is part of a plan that includes the allocation of state funds
of $50 million over the next five years for stem cell research. 177 By adding
this to the state budget plan, New Jersey's governor has made NewJersey
the first state in the United States to provide funding for stem cell re-
search. 17 3 California is also currently exploring the issue of providing
state funding for stem cell research through a proposed ballot initiative
that would raise $3 billion over the next ten years specifically to fund stem
cell research. 179 These states' recognition of the importance of providing
funding for stem cell research provides more support for the call to Con-
gress to make this funding available on the federal level.
Allison B. Newhart
173. For a discussion of the relationship between federal funding and federal
regulation of stem cell research, see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the arguments for repealing the current congres-
sional ban and permitting federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, see
supra notes 102-26. For recommendations for a more permissive embryonic stem
cell research policy, see supra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
175. See Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey Governor Puts Stem Cell Research in Budget
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
02/21/nyregion/21jersey.html (discussing NewJersey and California state funding
plans for stem cell research).
176. See id. (explaining governor's plan to include state funding in budget for
stem cell research institute).
177. See id. (explaining that governor plans to spend $50 million over five
years for stem cell research).
178. See id. (noting that advisers to governor found in their research that no
other state funds stem cell research).
179. See id. (explaining California's ballot initiative).
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